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 Abstract 
 
Information concerning the long-term consequences of credit repayment decisions is often 
not available for flexible credit facilities such as credit cards. The role of such information in 
repayment decisions was investigated in two questionnaire-based experiments in which bank 
customers (N = 241; 300) were presented with credit card and remortgage repayment 
scenarios. A dual mental accounting model of money management predicted that repayments 
would be influenced by both total cost and loan duration information. In both studies these 
were varied in a 2 x 2 randomised-groups factorial design. Experiment 2 also investigated the 
role of key economic and psychological factors, including some related to a risk defusing 
operator model of risk management. In both studies analysis of covariance showed that 
information on the long-term consequences of repayment decisions lead to significantly 
higher levels of repayment. However, in Experiment 2, it was found using hierarchical 
multiple regression that disposable income, level of education, and the perception of, and 
worry about, repayment difficulties had larger significant effects on repayment levels. The 
findings are interpreted in terms of mental accounting and risk defusing operator models. The 
role of worry was more complex than anticipated and further research on this is proposed.  
 
Keywords: Consumer credit, Decision making, Mental accounting, Risk defusing 
operators   




 This paper concerns the psychology of flexible credit repayment decisions, such as 
those for credit cards. The Office of Fair Trading (2004), in their UK credit card survey, 
found that a third of the population were using credit cards to purchase goods and services 
and of these only 47% paid off the full amount at the end of each month. Overall, UK credit 
card annual transactions grew from £87.3 billion in 2002 to £105.2 billion in 2006 (Office of 
Fair Trading, 2008). Flexible credit allows the consumer to choose the level of their monthly 
repayments from month to month. This is in contrast to closed-end loans where the amount 
borrowed must be repaid in a specified number of fixed repayment amounts. Chien and 
DeVaney (2001) suggest that mental processes and risk perception are different for flexible 
credit decisions compared to those for closed-end loans. Such mental processes may include, 
for example, consideration of current and future income, expenditure and assets (Shefrin & 
Thaler, 1988). 
 To address the lack of a common conceptual framework for credit decision research, 
Kamleitner and Kirchler (2007) proposed a three stage model with the addition of situational 
and personal characteristics (see also Gärling, Kirchler, Lewis, & van Raaij, 2009; Kirchler, 
Hoelzl & Kamleitner, 2008). The first stage they identified concerns processes before credit 
take up, the second involves those at the time of the decision to take it, and the third stage 
concerns processes during the repayment period. For closed-end credit, decisions concerning 
the level of repayment are taken at the second stage, whereas for flexible credit they are made 
periodically during the third stage. 
 In the present paper we consider the effects of providing total cost and loan duration 
information on repayment decisions with flexible credit. Two independent-groups 
experiments are reported that test predictions from dual mental accounting and risk defusing 
operator (RDO) models. The first presented UK bank customers with two scenarios, a credit 
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card and a mortgage with options to overpay, and varied the above-mentioned supplementary 
information. The second experiment replicated and extended the first with a different sample 
of UK bank customers. It also investigated the role of key economic and psychological 
factors, including some related to a risk defusing operator model of risk management. 
Total cost, loan duration and credit repayment decisions 
 In a process tracing study, Ranyard, Hinkley, Williamson & McHugh (2006) found 
that when making closed-end repayment decisions, credit consumers frequently ask about, 
and made trade-offs between, monthly repayment amount, total cost and loan duration. 
Participants’ information search and “think aloud” responses were interpreted as evidence 
that consumers develop simplified mental representations of instalment credit in terms of dual 
mental accounts (Ranyard & Craig, 1995). The first of these is a total account, which is the 
sum of all repayment instalments, i.e. the absolute, total cost of the loan ignoring the 
distribution of repayments over time. The hypothesis that the total mental account 
representation, and therefore total cost, influences credit decisions was further tested in 
experiments presenting decision scenarios involving credit alternatives varying in loan 
duration and fixed monthly repayments. Although APR information had a strong effect on 
such decisions, its effect was moderated by total cost information (Ranyard et al., 2006; 
McHugh, Ranyard, & Lewis, 2011). 
 As Thaler (1985, 1999) has argued, people also mentally simplify a series of financial 
transactions by grouping them into budget periods, often weekly or monthly to coincide with 
regular income. Ranyard and Craig (1995) described this kind of mental account as a 
recurrent, budget period account to incorporate the anticipation that future budget periods are 
generally similar in times of financial stability. A primary concern of any credit decision is to 
consider the affordability of the repayment relative to anticipated income and other budget 
period constraints. In addition, credit consumers are also concerned with the number of 
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budget periods for which credit repayments are necessary, i.e. the loan duration. Ranyard et 
al.’s (2006) process tracing study found that participants often sought to reduce loan duration, 
taking account of the affordability of higher repayments for shorter loan periods. Also, 
Henderson and Peterson (1992) found that consumers often choose credit for car purchase 
with duration corresponding to their expected ownership of the vehicle (see also, Wonder, 
Willhelm & Fewings, 2008). 
 There are important differences between closed-end and flexible credit in the 
information normally available. With closed-end credit, borrowers usually have available 
information concerning the long term implications of repayment decisions, i.e. the 
consequent loan duration and total cost of alternative levels of repayment. However, when 
borrowers have to decide how much they want to repay with flexible credit, the long term 
consequences of their decisions are unclear. Several studies have shown that estimates of loan 
duration for flexible credit are quite inaccurate (Lewis & van Venrooij, 1995; Overton & 
MacFadyen, 1998). Usually the monthly percentage rate of interest is available, but from this 
neither the number of instalments, nor the financial charge or total cost of the loan are 
precisely known. Furthermore, although APR information is also readily available to 
borrowers, this is also not useful as an aid to gauging either loan duration or total cost; its 
relationship to these aspects of the loan is rather complex. Ranyard and Craig (1993) 
explored the effect of providing total cost and APR information on estimates of loan duration 
and found that total cost significantly improved estimates of loan duration, whereas APR led 
to significantly less accurate estimates. That is, if the total cost for a certain average monthly 
repayment amount is known, then loan duration can be readily estimated. The above 
considerations lead us to predict that flexible credit repayments will be influenced by 
information concerning their long term consequences. Specifically:  
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H1: When total cost and loan duration information are available, people will choose 
significantly higher credit repayment levels.  
As far as we know, this hypothesis has not previously been tested. 
Other economic and psychological determinants of credit repayment decisions 
 In addition to information concerning total cost and loan duration information, there 
are other potential determinants of repayment levels1. First, as discussed earlier, a key 
economic factor is the borrower’s income, or disposable income, which generally determines 
their maximum affordable repayment. If people are future oriented rather than present 
oriented (Webley & Nyhus, 2001), they will be motivated to maximise repayments in order to 
ameliorate the long term negative consequences of credit decisions. This would result in a 
positive relationship between income, or disposable income, and repayment level. Second, 
the borrower’s level of education may be related to repayment decisions, because level of 
education is related to financial capability (Financial Services Authority, 2006; Taylor, 
Jenkins & Slacker, 2009). However, it is unclear a priori whether the relationship between 
financial capability and repayment level would be positive or negative. On the one hand, 
more capable borrowers may choose higher repayments because they tend to be more future-
oriented. On the other hand, they may choose lower repayment levels in order to better 
manage the risks of repayment difficulties. This latter issue was examined by Ranyard, 
Hinkley and Williamson (2001) in a process tracing study of credit consumers’ decisions 
concerning payment protection insurance (PPI). This study evaluated the validity of Huber’s 
(1997, 2007) risk defusing model, which proposes that if people perceive a risk, such as 
1 Several potential determinants of repayment decisions were not investigated in the present research, such as 
attitudes towards credit and debt (Livingstone & Lunt, 1992; Lea, Webley & Walker, 1995), temporal 





                                                          
future repayment difficulties, they will search for a risk defusing operator (RDO). One 
important RDO is control: attempting to reduce the probability of the negative outcome 
below a threshold. Ranyard et al. argued that the level of repayment can be used to control 
the risk of future repayment difficulties in two ways: (1) it could be set low in order to reduce 
the risk of difficulties for the recurrent budget period account; or alternatively (2) it could be 
set high to reduce the duration over which the risk is experienced. Therefore, the relationship 
between the borrower’s subjective probability of repayment difficulties and level of 
repayment chosen may be either positive or negative. Finally, emotions and anticipated 
emotions concerning repayment difficulties may be relevant to repayment decisions 
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, C. & Welch, 2001; Peters & Slovic, 2000; Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans & Pieters, 2008), especially 
worry (Sjöberg, 1998). Recently, Ranyard and McHugh (2010) found that the decision to take 
PPI was related to worry concerning future repayment difficulties. This could also be related 
to decisions concerning level of repayment, although as with the subjective probability of 
repayment difficulties, the direction of association could be positive or negative. The above 
considerations lead to our second hypothesis, addressed in Experiment 2: 
 H2: Level of repayment will be significantly predicted by disposable income, level of 
education, the subjective probability of the likelihood of repayment difficulties, and 
worry about repayment difficulties. 
The influence on repayment decisions of the psychological factors stated in this hypothesis 
has not previously been investigated. 
Experiment 1 
 The aim of the first experiment was to test H1, which predicts that the repayment 




Design and questionnaires 
 This study was part of a larger questionnaire survey of customers of a high street bank 
with some questions varied across participants. Responses to the first four questions are 
reported elsewhere. For questions five and six, a 2 x 2 factorial independent-groups design 
was adopted with independent variables total cost information (given or not) and loan 
duration information (given or not given), resulting in four experimental conditions. Two 
credit repayment scenarios were devised, one based on repaying a credit card balance of 
£1,500 (question 5) and the other on remortgaging a property loan of £40,000 (question 6). 
The dependent variable was the average of the repayment levels chosen in the two scenarios. 
Four versions of the questions were prepared with different information corresponding to the 
four experimental conditions. The credit card scenario for the condition with both total cost 
and loan duration is presented in Table 1, which shows that participants were asked to choose 
one of seven repayment levels. One version of the questionnaire presented all the information 
as in Table 1 (without shading); a second showed only the monthly repayment level and the 
tick box; a third showed monthly repayment level, loan duration (second column) and tick 
box; and the fourth showed monthly repayment level, total cost (third column) and tick box. 
The £40,000 mortgage scenario had the same information variation between the versions.  In 
this case participants were asked to choose one of eight repayments; the highest monthly 
repayment was £768 for 5 years, repayments then decreased on a scale to the lowest of £252 
for 25 years. The final questions of the questionnaire, the same in all versions, requested 
demographic information including age, gender and income. 
Participants and Procedure  
 The participants were recruited from a random sample of 2000 adults from a high 
street bank’s database of personal account customers.  They were randomly assigned to one 
of four equal groups each of which received one of the four questionnaires, posted with a 
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covering letter and return postage paid envelope. The letter explained the purpose of the 
study and that any information provided was for research purposes only and would remain 
anonymous.  The participants were asked to read the introduction, and then to make their 
decisions by ticking a box.  Participants returning the questionnaire could choose to 
participate in a cash prize draw.  If they wished to be included in the draw, contact details 
were to be entered at the end of the questionnaire; this information was detached from the 
questionnaire during the opening and sorting process.  
 Of the 242 replies, (12.1% return) nearly all completed the section on personal 
characteristics: 62% were male and 38% female; 85% were working. The majority of 
participants were older, with only 17% being between 16 and 40 years, 28% between 40 and 
50, and 55% above 50.  For annual income, respondents reported as follows: 33% up to 
£20,000; 30% between £20,000 and £35,000; and 37% above £35,000.  The number of 
participants returning questionnaires in each group was 47, 61, 66 and 68. Chi-square and 
Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that there were no significant differences in the above 
demographic characteristics across the four groups. 
Results 
 A 2 x 2 analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was carried out with independent 
variables total cost and loan duration information. The covariates were age, gender and 
income, and the dependent variable was average repayment level. As summarized in Table 2, 
the ANCOVA showed that there was a small but significant effect of total cost information, a 
moderate significant effect of loan duration information, and no significant interaction 
between these independent variables. In addition, with respect to the covariates, Table 2 
shows that there were no significant effects of age or gender on repayment level decisions 
although as expected, income did have a moderate significant effect: higher income was 
related to higher repayments. Mean repayment levels across the four experimental conditions 
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are shown in Figure 1, on a scale from 1 (lowest repayment) to 7.5 (highest repayment on 
both scenarios). It can be seen that that the group receiving only monthly repayment 
information had the lowest mean repayment level and the other three groups, presented with 
either total cost, loan duration information or both, had similar mean repayments, nearly one 
unit higher. In summary then, H1, the hypothesis that providing total cost or loan duration 
information would encourage higher repayment levels, was supported. These findings will be 
discussed in the final section. 
---- Table 2 and Figure 1 here ----- 
Experiment 2 
 The first aim of experiment 2 was to further test H1 by replicating and extending 
experiment 1 using a more sensitive dependent variable based on four repayment scenarios. 
The second aim was to test H2 and in addition, assess the relative impact of long-term 
consequence information on repayment decisions, in relation to the economic and 
psychological factors stated in H2. 
 The data for this second study was collected during the period of January to March 
2009, a time of credit crunch anxiety as the UK was officially declared to be in recession. In 
the UK during 2008 house prices fell on average 10.5% and consumer confidence continued 
to decline as fears about rising unemployment and the effects of the global recession gathered 
momentum.  In October 2008 the Chancellor of the Exchequer warned that the UK economy 
was facing its worse crisis for 60 years, and announced rescue packages for 3 high street 
banks and nationalised one of the largest building societies. The credit crunch and recession 
would be likely to have an impact on the risk perception of people and on their financial 
planning.  For some the uncertain outlook of the national economy and its effects on 
individual households would mean additional worry about their finances. To explore the 
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effect of worry about the general economic climate on risk perception and credit decisions an 
additional question not previously used was included in the second study.    
Method 
Design and questionnaires 
 The basic design and procedure for experiment 2 were the same as experiment 1 but 
with four credit repayment scenarios instead of two, and several new economic and 
psychological variables included. The study was part of a larger questionnaire survey of 
customers of a high street bank with some questions varied across participants. Some of the 
questions, concerning payment protection insurance decisions, are reported elsewhere. Part 1 
of the questionnaire was a 2 x 2 factorial independent-groups design with independent 
variables total cost information (given or not) and loan duration information (given or not 
given), resulting in four experimental conditions. The credit repayment scenarios from 
experiment 1, based on repaying a credit card balance of £1,500 and on remortgaging a 
property loan of £40,000, were used together with two additional scenarios involving a credit 
card balance of £3,000 and a property loan of £80,000. The dependent variable was the 
average of the repayment levels chosen in the four scenarios. As in experiment 1, four 
versions of the questions were prepared with different information corresponding to the four 
experimental conditions. One of the mortgage scenarios for the condition with both total cost 
and loan duration is shown in Table 3, which shows that participants were asked to choose 
one of eight repayment levels. 
Part 2 of the questionnaire included questions that measured psychological variables 
concerning cognitive appraisal and worry about repayment difficulties, with responses 
required on a 7-point scale (reverse-coded for analysis): 
1. Subjective probability of repayment difficulties (Risk SP). If you took out a loan 
today, for £7,500 over three years, how likely is it that you would have difficulties 
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with your repayments because of redundancy or not being able to work for several 
months due to sickness or injury? (1 = very likely; 7 = very unlikely); 
2. Worry about repayment difficulties, personal (Risk Worry 1). When thinking about 
taking out such a loan, how much would you worry about future difficulties with your 
repayments because of the above reasons? (1 = very worried; 7 = not at all worried); 
3. Worry about repayment difficulties, external (Risk Worry 2). When thinking about 
taking out such a loan, how much would you worry about future difficulties with your 
repayments because of possible future rises in living costs? (1 = very worried; 7 = not 
at all worried). 
Finally, Part 3 of the questionnaire invited participants to give some demographic 
details, including age in bands of 10 years, and gender. Information on monthly disposable 
income (DI) was requested on a 9 point scale, from up to £150 per month to over £2,000 per 
month.  Level of education was divided into three: 1 = leaving school with no further 
training; 2= further/higher education; 3 = degree/professional/occupational qualifications. 
Participants and Procedure   
 The participants were recruited from a new random sample of 2000 adults from a high 
street bank’s database of personal account customers.  As in experiment 1, they were 
randomly assigned to one of four equal groups each of which received one of the four 
questionnaires. The procedure adopted was the same as in experiment 1. Of the 301 replies, 
(15% return), respondents were 50.3% female; median age = 48 years, range 20 to 69 years; 
median monthly disposable income = £605; Professional or university level education, 63%.  
The number of questionnaires returned in the four groups varied from 48 to 87. 
Results 
In order to test H1, as in the first experiment a 2 x 2 analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) was carried out with independent variables total cost information and loan 
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duration information. The dependent variable was the average repayment level across the 
four scenarios and there were five covariates: disposable income, level of education, Risk SP; 
Risk Worry 1 and Risk Worry 2. The results are summarized in Table 4, which shows that 
although there were no significant main effects, there was a small but significant interaction 
between total cost and loan duration information. The nature of this is illustrated in Figure 2, 
which shows the mean repayment levels across the four experimental groups. It can be seen 
that providing either total cost or loan duration information individually resulted in higher 
monthly repayments (about half a scale point). However, unlike in experiment 1, their 
combined effects were not additive, although repayment levels were still slightly higher than 
the baseline condition without long-term consequence information. These findings offer some 
support for H1since when total cost and loan duration information are available, participants 
chose higher repayment levels. Table 4 also shows that all the economic and psychological 
covariates had significant effects on repayment levels that were at least small to medium. In 
particular, the effect of disposable income was quite large. These effects are discussed in 
more detail below. 
------ Table 4 and Figure 2 about here ----- 
 The second analysis tested H2, which proposed that level of repayment decisions will 
be significantly predicted by disposable income (DI), level of education, the subjective 
probability of repayment difficulties (Risk SP), and worry about repayment difficulties (Risk 
worry 1, Risk worry 2), was investigated by correlation and regression analysis. The 
Pearson’s product-moment correlations among these variables are shown in Table 5. First, it 
can be seen that there were significant positive correlations between level of repayment 
decisions and both DI and level of education. Second, there were significant negative 
correlations between level of repayment and both Risk SP and Risk Worry 2, although the 
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correlation between level of repayment and Risk Worry 1 was not significant. Finally, the 
table shows that several correlations between the predictors were significant. 
 The main analysis to test H2 was hierarchical multiple regression with outcome 
variable average level of repayment. The predictors were entered as follows: step 1, the 
economic variable DI; step 2, the demographic variable level of education; step 3, the 
cognitive variable, Risk SP; step 4, the emotion-related variables Risk Worry 1 and Risk 
worry 2. As the table shows (top part), prediction improved significantly at each step with R2 
= 0.25 for the final model. Table 6 also shows the statistics for the final model (bottom part). 
It can be seen that all five variables were significant predictors, with DI having a moderate 
effect predicting choice of higher repayment level. Level of education and Risk worry 1 had 
small effects in the same direction, whereas Risk SP and Risk worry 2 had small effects 
predicting choice of lower repayment. 
----- Tables 5 and 6 about here ----- 
Discussion 
The role of long-term consequence information 
 In both experiments hypothesis 1 was supported: total cost and loan duration 
information had statistically small but significant effects on credit repayment decisions. The 
absolute effect was that with either item of information, repayment levels were higher by 
between a half and one scale point, although the effects of the two items of information were 
not consistently additive. The effects of total cost and loan duration information have 
different theoretical implications. On the one hand, the effect of total cost information 
supports the proposition that people mentally represent the cost of credit in terms of a 
simplified total account representation (Ranyard & Craig, 1993, 1995; McHugh et al., 2011). 
On the other hand, the effect of loan duration information is consistent with the general 
tendency towards future-orientation rather than present orientation (Webley & Nyhus, 2001). 
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More specifically, the direction of the effect, moving decisions towards higher repayments 
and shorter loan duration, serves the long-term financial planning goal of removing the credit 
repayment cost from the recurrent budget period account as quickly as possible (Ranyard & 
Craig, 1995). Related to this, Ranyard et al. (2006) reported preferences for higher 
repayments and shorter loan duration with closed-end loans. Also, as mentioned earlier, 
Henderson and Peterson’s (1992) findings show that long-term financial planning is a factor 
in repayment decisions. 
 An alternative interpretation of the effect of loan duration information is possible in 
terms of temporal discounting. If future repayments were discounted according to an 
exponential discounted utility model, then awareness of the loan duration would lead to 
preference for loans of shorter duration with higher repayments, as long as the subjective 
discount rate were lower than the APR of the loan (in fact, the total account model assumes 
zero discount rate). However, Estalami (2001) has shown that discount rates are highly 
context-dependent and consequently, clear predictions from discounted utility models are 
difficult to test. Similarly, Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue (2002, p394 argue for 
‘relinquishing the assumption that the key to understanding intertemporal choices is finding 
the right discount rate (or even the right discount function)’ in favour of ‘readopting the view 
that intertemporal choices reflect many distinct considerations and often involve the interplay 
of several competing motives’. We conclude therefore, that future-orientation and financial 
planning offer a better account of our findings concerning loan duration information. 
Disposable income, long-term consequence information and repayment decisions  
 It is useful to consider the effects of information concerning the long-term 
consequences of repayment decisions relative to the effect of income, or more importantly, 
disposable income.  In experiment 1, reported annual income was requested in bands of 
£5,000, increasing from the lowest (below £10,000). Analysis of covariance showed that this 
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correlated positively with repayment decisions, with an effect size statistically small but 
similar to that of total cost and loan duration information. Simple linear regression showed 
that the absolute effect was rather small, with an increase of one income band producing on 
average an increase of about one-ninth of a repayment level. In experiment 2, since 
disposable income is clearly more relevant to repayment decisions than annual income, 
information on monthly disposable income was requested (in bands of about £200, from the 
lowest of less than £150). Analysis of covariance revealed a moderate effect of disposable 
income. Furthermore, the first step of the hierarchical regression analysis showed that the 
absolute, simple effect of disposable income was rather substantial, with an increase of one 
band of disposable income producing on average an increase of more than one repayment 
level. This was somewhat greater than the effect of long-term consequence information 
reported in both experiments. 
 Affordability clearly influenced participants’ repayment decisions.  In experiment 2, 
for each scenario overall (across the four versions of the questionnaire), there were 
differences according to loan amount. Response frequencies indicate a preference for quicker 
repayment for the lower credit card (£1.5K) and mortgage loan amount (£40K) compared to 
the larger loan of each type (£3K credit card and £80K). The monthly repayments to clear the 
larger of the loans of each type in the shortest time was double that for the smaller ones.  This 
preference is likely to be a reflection of the affordability in the repayments relative to 
disposable income.  
Other factors predicting repayment decisions  
 Experiment 2 also aimed to test H2: level of repayment will be significantly predicted 
by disposable income, level of education, the subjective probability of the likelihood of 
repayment difficulties, and worry about repayment difficulties. As discussed above, 
disposable income predicted level of repayment in the expected direction, and hierarchical 
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regression analysis showed that the other factors also predicted it significantly. Participants’ 
educational experience was categorised in three levels, essentially secondary, further and 
higher. Level of education accounted for a small but significant proportion of variance in 
repayment decisions in addition to that accounted for by disposable income. The direction of 
the effect suggests that more financially capable participants chose higher repayments 
because they tend to be more future-oriented, as discussed earlier.  
 The next variable entered in the regression analysis, participants’ subjective 
probability of repayment difficulties, also had a small and significant additional effect on 
repayment decisions, with higher subjective probability associated with decisions for lower 
repayments. In terms of Huber’s RDO model, this suggests that participants who perceived a 
significant risk sought to control it by choosing lower repayments, rather than by choosing 
shorter loan duration.  In the final step of the regression analysis, two measures of worry 
concerning future repayment difficulties were entered. Although jointly they made a small 
and significant additional contribution to the prediction of repayment decisions, their 
individual effects were in opposite directions. This is difficult to explain.  
Concluding remarks  
 We found that participants decided to repay significantly more when they were given 
information about the long-term consequences of alternative repayment options. We 
explained the effect of total cost information with reference to a total account representation 
of credit cost (Ranyard & Craig, 1995), and the effect of loan duration information in terms 
of future-oriented thinking and long-term planning. It is necessary to recognise that although 
these separate interpretations of the effects of total cost information and loan duration 
information are plausible, these two items of information are interdependent (Ranyard & 
Craig, 1993). In any case, we did not find clear evidence that their effects were additive. 
Consequently, the two interpretations are confounded, and further research could usefully 
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disentangle the roles of the total mental account representation and financial planning in 
repayment decisions. 
 Stewart (2009) recently reported evidence that information on credit card minimum 
repayments influences the real repayment decisions of those not repaying the minimum as 
well as influencing hypothetical repayment decisions. Further research would be useful to 
investigate whether our findings on the effects of long-term consequence information 
generalise to real credit card repayment decisions. In addition, further research on Stewart’s 
findings would be useful. He found that minimum repayment information influenced 
repayment decisions in the absence of long-term consequence information. However, this is a 
context of uncertainty that previous research has shown to be particularly conducive to such 
anchoring effects (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000). It might be expected that the anchoring effect 
of minimum repayment information would disappear if uncertainty were reduced by giving 
information on the long-term consequences of alternative levels of repayment. In any case, 
we argue that this information should routinely be provided on credit card statements to 
support consumers in making more financially capable decisions (Atkinson, Mckay, Collard 
& Kempson, 2007 Taylor, Jenkins, S & Slacker, 2009). 
 Finally, our findings show that as well as disposable income and therefore 
affordability, repayment decisions are influenced by perceptions and emotions concerning 
future repayment difficulties. Specifically, choosing lower repayments was associated with 
perceptions of greater likelihood of repayment difficulties. In terms of Huber’s (1997, 2007) 
model, then, choosing lower repayments may be an RDO used to control this risk. The role of 
worry about such risks was not straightforward, however. In general, borrowers are advised 
not to ‘overstretch’ themselves, which can be seen as recognition of the value of this control 
RDO. Future research would be useful to clarify three issues: (1) the role of lowering level of 
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repayment as an RDO for credit risk management, in relation to other RDOs such as taking 
out payment protection insurance (Ranyard & McHugh, 2010); (2) the influence of worry on 
repayment decisions; and (3) differences in borrowers’ credit risk management strategies for 
different types of credit, especially mortgages versus consumer credit.  
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Table 1.  Examples of credit card decision scenario  
 
Imagine that you have just paid for a holiday, home improvements, or personal/household 
goods to the value of £1,500.  You have used your credit card to make the purchase(s).  The 




How much do you 
want to pay 
monthly? 
Time to clear the 
loan if same 
payments made 











£41 48 months £1,968  
£52 36 months £1,872  
£72 24 months £1,728  
£98 17 months £1,666  
£135 12 months £1,620  




Table 2.  Study 1: ANCOVA significance tests of main effects (total cost and loan duration 
information), their interaction and three covariates. 
 




F (1, 209) 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Total cost information (TC)   8.58  4.98* .023 
Loan duration information (LD)  15.47  8.99** .041 
 TC x LD   2.52   1.47 .007 
Covariates     
Income  19.87 11.54*** .052 
Age   5.01   2.91 .014 
Gender  1.61   0.93 .004 




Table 3. Study 2: Example of mortgage scenario for £80,000.  
Imagine you have reviewed your repayment mortgage account.  You still have further mortgage 
payments to make before the time comes when you will own your home outright.  You have 
renegotiated your mortgage for a lower interest rate of 5.9%.  You now have to decide in the two 
examples below the number of years you wish to take to repay. 
Mortgage loan of £80,000 
 
Amount of monthly 
repayments 
 
Number of years to 
continue to make 
mortgage payments 







£1536  5 years  £92,160  
£1040  8 years   £99,840  
   £878 10 years £105,360  
   £770 12 years £110,880  
   £664 15 years £119,520  
   £594 18 years £128,304  
   £560 20 years £134,400  




Table 4.  Study 2: ANCOVA significance tests of main effects (total cost and loan duration 
information), their interaction and five covariates. 
 




F (1, 280) 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Total cost information (TC)      58.97   2.10 .007 
Loan duration information (LD)        4.65   0.17 .001 
 TC x LD    119.34   4.25* .015 
Covariates     
Disposable income  1047.12 37.20*** .118 
Level of education     240.70   8.57** .030 
Risk SP 
Risk worry 1 
Risk worry 2 
    263.80 
  298.25 
  217.08 
   9.39** 
 10.62** 




Note: * significant at p < .05; ** significant at p < .01; *** significant at p < .001 
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Table 5.  Study 2: Pearson correlations matrix for variables relevant to H2 (n = 291-298). 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Variable    Risk SP RW1 RW2 Ed DI  
Level of repayment   -.23  -.10 -.24 .26  .41 
Risk SP       .57  .31 -.15 -.22 
Risk Worry 1 (RW1)       .61  -.12* -.27 
Risk Worry 2 (RW2)        -.13* -.32 
Level of education (Ed)                    .29 
Disposable income (DI) 
_______________________________________________________________ 
* = significant at p < .05 
Bold type = significant at p < .01 
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Table 6.  Study 2: Hierarchical regression analysis of five predictors of level of repayment.  
______________________________________________________________ 
Step Predictors added R R2  Adjusted R2  ∆R2   
_____________________________________________________________ 
1. Disposable income .41 .17  .17  .17*** 
  
2. Level of education .44 .19  .19  .03** 
 
3. Risk SP  .45 .21  .20  .01*   
 
4. Risk Worry 1, 2 .49 .24  .23  .04** 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Final Model        B             SEB                β 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Constant       14.80   1.53  
Disposable income    0.87    0.14     .34** 
Level of education    1.26    0.44     .15** 
Risk SP      -.78    0.24    -.21** 
Risk Worry 1 (personal)   0.91    0.27      .26** 
Risk Worry 2 (economy)     -.67    0.25    -.18*     
     ________________________________________________________________ 
       * p < .05, ** p < .01 




Figure 1. Study 1: Mean repayment levels for each condition. 
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